We’re sure you are all asking, “Hey Nerds! Where the heck have you been for the past few months?”
We could tell you that the real world, such as work, and contributions to various 250th Anniversary of the American Revolution celebrations, all got in the way. Instead, we’re going to be vague and tell you only that the CIA recruited us for a top-secret mission that involved a treasure map on the back of a Bicentennial commemorative plaque, aliens, a high-speed chase through Cairo, Sean Bean, and Whitesnake. If we told you anything else, we’d have to kill you.
In the days that followed the Battle of Bunker Hill, a stalemate emerged between British and colonial forces as both sides sought to recover from the intense conflict. Thousands of New England men continued to encircle Boston, and the morale among British soldiers had plummeted after the battle. Meanwhile, the supply interdiction efforts by New England privateers were starting to complicate life within the town.
American forces were commanded by General Artemas Ward, who was born on November 26, 1727, in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts. As a child, Ward attended local schools and shared a tutor with his siblings. He graduated from Harvard and briefly taught there. In 1752, he was appointed Justice of the Peace and served multiple terms as a representative in the Colonial General Assembly and the executive council. During the French and Indian War, Ward rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was appointed Brigadier General by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts on October 27, 1774.
After the battles of Lexington and Concord, he was formally named Commander in Chief of the Massachusetts Grand Army on May 19, 1775.
Ward faced significant challenges while overseeing the early months of the Siege of Boston. The provincial army surrounding Boston began to dwindle rapidly. Regiments suffered from a lack of organization, and soldiers were consistently coming and going. Initially, militiamen left in small groups, but soon the exodus escalated to hundreds, as dwindling provisions and responsibilities back home eroded their sense of duty.
Expressing his concern, Artemas Ward remarked that he feared he would soon be left alone at the siege. “My situation is such,” he stated, “that if I do not receive enlisting orders immediately, I shall be left all alone. It is impossible to keep the men here unless something is done. I therefore urge that the plan be completed and handed to me this morning, and that you, gentlemen of the Congress, issue orders for enlisting men.”
To meet this problem, the Provincial Congress agreed to General Ward’s requests that the men be formally enlisted for a given time. The legislative body resolved to raise a “Massachusetts Grand Army of 13,600 men and appoint a Committee of Supplies to collect and distribute the necessary commodities.”
In undertaking this venture, Massachusetts turned to the model it had followed to attract recruits for provincial regiments during the French and Indian War. When the Massachusetts government appointed a regimental colonel to serve in the French and Indian War, he was given a packet of blank commissions for officers he could dispense as he saw fit. Often, commissions would be contingent upon the prospective officers’ success in recruiting men. To secure enlistments of private soldiers, junior officers frequently made arrangements with prospective non-commissioned officers, promising posts as sergeants or corporals in return for their assistance in recruiting drives. While many recruiters operated within the confines of their own minute man or militia regiment that fought on April 19, recruiters were also authorized to beat their drums anywhere in the province to enlist volunteers. Local militia officers were prohibited from interfering with beating orders and were required to muster their companies and assist the colonel and his prospective officers with drafting recruits.
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| Photo Credit: George Comeau |
After the regiments were raised and certified, they were adopted into the Massachusetts Grand Army and assigned regimental numbers. It appears that the regiments were assigned regimental numbers based on the “rank or age of the counties” from which they were raised.
Complicating Ward’s newly formed army was the continuous lack of supplies needed to maintain the siege, particularly gunpowder. In a joint letter with Joseph Warren, Ward pleaded to the Colony of New York to send ammunition and gunpowder to his soldiers. “We suffer at present the greatest inconveniences from a want of a sufficient quantity of [gun]powder; without this every attempt to defend ourselves or annoy our enemies, must prove abortive. We have taken every step to avail ourselves of this article, by drawing into our general magazines whatever could be spared from the respective Towns of this Colony; but the frequent skirmishes we have had have greatly diminished our stock, and we are now under the most alarming apprehensions that, notwithstanding the bravery of our troops, (whom we think we can, without boasting, declare are ready to encounter every danger for the preservation of the rights and liberties of America,) we shall, barely for want of the means of defence, fall at last a prey to our enemies. We, therefore, most earnestly beseech you, that you would warmly recommend it to the other Colonies, to send whatever ammunition they can possibly spare forthwith to our relief.”
To his credit, during the initial months of the Siege, General Ward effectively maintained the Grand Army’s defensive lines around Boston and successfully coordinated a supply interdiction operation against His Majesty’s forces. However, historians and contemporaries have critiqued his management of the Battle of Bunker Hill from Cambridge. Some claimed that he exhibited excessive caution, while others contended that his ineptitude contributed to the failure in ensuring the beleaguered troops atop the hill received adequate supplies. James Warren, who succeeded Joseph Warren as President of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, expressed his frustration, remarking that the General “never left his house” while soldiers perished on Breed’s Hill.
Regardless of whether Ward was an effective commander or a fool, his time as Commander-in-Chief of the American army was quickly coming to an end.
Weeks into the siege, General Ward wrote to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, outlining the difficulties he faced in organizing an army to counter British aggression and urgently requesting support. His letter sparked a heated debate among the delegates. Should the Continental Congress back the Massachusetts war effort, and if so, should they authorize the formation of an Army of the United Colonies? If they decided in favor, who should be appointed to lead it? While Artemas Ward has the necessary experience and is familiar with his troops, he remains relatively unknown beyond New England. Many delegates voiced their concerns regarding New England’s involvement in the conflict thus far, viewing the New Englanders as rabble-rousers and troublemakers. Other members believed it was essential to garner physical and political support outside of the turbulent New England region. If there is to be an Army of the United Colonies, it must be agreed upon and endorsed by all the colonies, not only those in the North.
On June 17, amidst the turmoil of the Battle of Bunker Hill, delegates gathered at the Continental Congress in Philadelphia to deliberate on the best ways to support the Siege of Boston and the possibility of establishing a unified standing army comprised of soldiers from all the American Colonies. Focus soon shifted to a Virginian who had consistently attended Congressional meetings in his military uniform. As a result, growing support emerged for the idea that this individual could serve as the new Commander in Chief.
George Washington was born on February 22, 1732, in the Northern Neck of Virginia to a middle-class but ambitious gentry family. Although he was the first child of Augustine Washington and Mary Ball, George had two older brothers and a sister from his father’s previous marriage, and he would later be joined by four surviving full siblings.
George’s prospects changed dramatically in 1743 when Augustine passed away at the young age of 48, continuing the family pattern of early male deaths that ultimately facilitated George’s ascent. By 1754, he assumed control of Mount Vernon and its enslaved laborers. In the wake of his father’s death, the 11-year-old George was deprived of the educational opportunities in England that his older brothers had received. This lack of formal schooling caused him considerable embarrassment throughout his life. Instead of pursuing academic development, Washington gained practical experience by traveling through the Virginia backcountry as a surveyor.
Despite lacking formal education, the young man was fortunate to have benefactors, particularly due to his brother Lawrence’s marriage into the esteemed Fairfax family. These connections allowed Washington to pursue a military career, leading him to become Colonel of the Virginia Regiment and commander-in-chief of the colony’s forces by the age of 34. Throughout the French and Indian War, Colonel Washington gained invaluable leadership experience, earning a measure of fame for both his successes and failures.
A pivotal moment in George Washington’s life occurred on January 6, 1759, when he married Martha Dandridge Custis, a 27-year-old widow. This union not only combined his wealth with her estate but also elevated Washington into the ranks of colonial Virginia’s elite, approximately tripling the number of enslaved individuals under his control.
The next fifteen years were dedicated to managing and expanding Mount Vernon, nurturing his growing family, and fulfilling the civic duties expected of a gentleman of his rank, which included serving as a member of the House of Burgesses. During the politically charged decade of the 1760s and 1770s, Washington participated—often in a more reserved manner—in the significant debates and decisions surrounding colonial resistance. By 1774, he had gained enough prominence to become one of Virginia’s delegates to the Continental Congress, alongside the more renowned Patrick Henry.
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| Washington Taking Command of the American Army – At Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3rd, 1775. Currier & Ives (American, active New York, 1857–1907) |
For several reasons, Washington’s appointment as the Commander in Chief of an army representing the United Colonies was a logical choice. To transform the rebellion into a truly continental effort, the involvement of Virginia—the wealthiest and most populous colony—was essential. Congress sought a commander with substantial combat experience, and few possessed more than Washington. At forty-three, he was vigorous and youthful enough to endure the extended campaigns of a protracted conflict. Additionally, Washington’s fellow Virginians effectively persuaded many congressmen of his unwavering commitment to the patriot cause.
Politically, Washington occupied the role of a moderate revolutionary, a measured leader resolute in defending colonial rights. His presence further bolstered his case; several contemporaries noted his majestic appearance. Benjamin Rush remarked, “He possesses such martial dignity in his bearing that you can identify him as a general and a soldier among ten thousand.”
Following his appointment, Washington expressed his commitment to uphold the authority of the civilian leaders in Congress. He chose to forgo a salary, requesting only reimbursement for expenses incurred during the conflict. In his acceptance speech on June 16, he struck a note of humility, stating, “I am truly aware of the great honor bestowed upon me with this appointment… I do not consider myself equal to the command with which I have been honored.”
On June 23, 1775, Washington began his journey north to the Siege of Boston. The next day, the general started to receive reports of the dire condition of the New England Army surrounding Boston...specifically the lack of gunpowder. According to a June 24th letter to the Continental Congress, Washington noted, “Powder is so essential an Article that I cannot help again repeating the necessity of a supply. The Camp at Boston, from the best Accounts I can get from thence, is but very poorly supplied.”
On July 2, Washington arrived in Cambridge. The following day, he officially assumed command of the Massachusetts Grand Army, which was now integrated into the Continental Army, taking over from General Artemas Ward. He met with several high-ranking officers of the army and immediately set to work, joining his temporary housemate and third-in-command, Charles Lee, for a ride to inspect some of the siege lines surrounding Cambridge.
Dr. James Thatcher of Barnstable, Massachusetts, had an opportunity to observe General Washington. According to his journal, “I am informed that General George Washington arrived at our provincial camp, in this town, on the July 2; having been appointed, by the unanimous voice of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, general and commander-in-chief of all the troops raised, and to be raised, for the defence of the United Colonies, as they are now termed ... He has been received here with every mark of respect, and addressed by our Provincial Congress in the most affectionate and respectful manner. All ranks appear to repose full confidence in him as commander-in-chief; it is the fervent prayer of the religiously disposed, that he may be instrumental in bringing this unhappy controversy to an honorable and speedy termination.”
On July 3, 1775, Washington rode out before a large detachment of American troops drawn up on Cambridge Common to address them. He quickly sets the tone by declaring “The General most earnestly requires” order and obedience.”
When Washington arrived in Cambridge, he discovered a disorganized and diverse assembly of soldiers and weaponry. His pre-existing negative opinion of Yankee troops was only reinforced by what he observed at the gathering outside of Boston. New England officers, elected by their men, worked alongside their troops in performing menial tasks and often held occupations that Washington deemed unworthy. The camps set up by the New England soldiers were chaotic and frequently plagued by unhealthy and unsanitary conditions.
Simultaneously, many of the New England troops viewed Washington with suspicion as an outsider and were apprehensive about how he would treat them. Complicating the situation further, shortly after Washington took command, reinforcements from as far away as Maryland and Virginia began to arrive at the siege. The New England troops, already wary of Washington, became equally distrustful of these newcomers and engaged in brawls with them.
In an effort to restore order, Washington issued general instructions to the army, declaring that they and those who enlisted “are now Troops of the United Provinces of North America.” He expressed hope “that all Distinctions of Colonies will be laid aside; so that one and the same Spirit may animate the whole, and the only Contest be, who shall render, on this great and trying occasion, the most essential service to the Great and common cause in which we are all engaged.”
Washington began to transform the militias into an organization more akin to a formal army. He appointed senior officers—contrary to the militias’ tradition of electing their leaders—and introduced greater organization and disciplinary measures within the encamped militias. Drawing from his previous experience as commander of the Virginia Regiment and what he observed daily at his Cambridge encampment, he was convinced that an army composed of short-term volunteers, no matter their dedication to the cause, could not prevail in the war.
In a letter to John Hancock in February 1776, he articulated this belief: “To expect then the same service from raw, undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will happen.” His convictions on this matter only deepened over the years. From the outset, he maintained that militias served only as peripheral supplements to a core army; what was truly needed was a professional force of disciplined soldiers who, like him, were committed for the duration of the conflict.
His model, in effect, was the British Army.