Thursday, November 30, 2017

"We Fired on Them" - What Likely Happened at Parker's Revenge

In the hours after the Battle of Lexington, Captain Parker assembled his men on the village common. According to local folklore, the company then marched westward as fifer Jonathan Harrington played the Jacobite tune The White Cockade.

When the Lexington Company arrived at the Lexington-Lincoln border around 12:30 in the afternoon, Parker signaled the company to halt and then instructed his men to prepare for an ambush. Absent from the company was the confusion and hesitation of the earlier encounter with the British regulars. More than anyone else on that day, the Lexington Training Band wanted revenge.

So what really happened when Captain Parker’s Company attacked the retreating British column the afternoon of April 19th? Thanks to an archaeological survey and a subsequent report by Dr. Margaret Watters Wilkes, we now have a better sense of what transpired at the battle site better known as Parker’s Revenge. 



Parker selected a position near the Tabitha Nelson Homestead. This site included a house, barn, farmyard, orchard and woodlot. There were also several out buildings such as privies, sheds, and chicken coops dispersed throughout the property. Dozens and dozens of boulders of various sizes dotted the farmland. Along the eastern and southern boundaries of the property was a geological seep. A small bridge part of the Concord Road crossed over it. Adjacent to the homestead was a ledge that overlooked the property.

The site offered several tactical advantages to Parker and his men. The bridge would be a point of constriction for the retreating British forces - the retreating soldiers would have to slow down to cross the structure and would be more vulnerable to an attack. The boulders, structures and trees provided ample coverage and could serve as obstacles to a British counter assault. From their vantage point, Parker’s Company had a clear view down Concord Road. Not only would the militia have heard the battle coming toward them, but from their elevated position they could watch the British approach. Finally there was an accessible route that ran through the woodlot. The pathway not only provided an easy path of withdrawal but also permitted the men to re-engage the retreating column at the Bloody Bluff and Fiske Hill.

The majority of Parker’s men broke ranks and formed a long, staggered skirmish line along an elevated finger of land inside the woodlot overlooking the footbridge. Around one o’clock in the afternoon, Parker likely received information that the regulars were now marching back towards Lexington.

As the British column approached the Nelson Homestead, they had been marching and fighting for over twelve hours. According to Captain William Soutar of the Marines, Lt. Col. Smith’s column was subjected to a continuous barrage of musket fire that they did not anticipate. “The Country by this time had took ye alarm, and were immediately in arms, and had taken their different stations behind walls &c. on our flanks and thus we were harassed on our front, flanks and rear…by a continual fire for eighteen miles, it not being possible for us to meet a man otherwise than behind a bush, stone, hedge or tree, who immediately give his fire and off he went. Our companies were not able to march half of its front on the open road, or more properly speaking in two platoons, the second in rear of the first. On our leaving Concord we were immediately surrounded on every Quarter, and expected to be cut off every moment. Sometimes we took possession of one hill, sometimes of another; at the last it was determined to push forward to Lexington, which we did through a plaguey fire…” The regulars were running out of water and ammunition, and discipline in the British column was quickly breaking down.

The British had already suffered close to one hundred casualties. The retreating soldiers’ pace had likely slowed down because it was now encumbered with scores of wounded soldiers and officers that clung to horses, carts, carriages or whatever else might help them reach Boston. In fact, research conducted by Dr. Watters Wiles suggests the column may have been travelling only four miles per hour as it approached Parker’s position.

When the column reached the bridge, Smith’s column was suddenly in a very dangerous position. In short, the soldiers entered the lowest point of a “valley” along the seep feature while the Lexington militia held an elevated position.

The head of the column likely caught sight of the Lexington men. In response, a vanguard composed of light infantry formed on the seep feature, remained clustered together as they crossed the bridge and started to deploy towards Parker’s Company in a close, tight formation. Naturally, this offered an excellent target for the Lexington militia.

Parker waited until the soldiers were within fifty yards of his position before ordering his men to fire. The Lexington men then unleashed a volley that swept along the vanguard, instantly killing or wounding an unknown number of regulars. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith was struck in the thigh and Captain Parson of the 10th Regiment of Foot was hit in the arm.

The British light infantry completed its flanking deployment and then returned fired at the Lexington militia. Two Lexington militiamen, Jedediah Munroe and Nathan Wyman, were struck and killed. Immediately after discharging their muskets, the regulars swept up the slope. However, Parker and his men had already started to withdraw. After discharging a single volley, the militiamen quickly retired up the access path to the top of the hill and then moved down the east side. Once at the bottom, the company moved to a new position down the road to attack the column again. According to militiaman Nathan Munroe “We fired on them and continued to do so until they met their reinforcement in Lexington.” The British vanguard did not pursue the militiamen and returned to the column.

3 comments:

  1. 4 miles an hour is a pretty good clip on foot. What speed did British Columns normally move at ?

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  2. My apologies for the delay in getting back to you. I wanted to make sure I had an accurate response. I focused specifically on the April 18/19 march and then checked with a few historians in the area regarding the speed of the march. Some have suggested the column, at its slowest, moved at 3 MPH. Others have suggested the light infantry, at maximum speed, was moving about 5 MPH. I'm probably going to revise the sentence referencing the 4 MPH speed later this week to reflect this information.

    Awesome question, I appreciate it!

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    1. I was going to ask the exact question. I walk and hike quite a bit and I'm happy to be doing an average of 4 mph. That's a mile every 15 minutes. I doubt very much they could not do that dragging wounded with the column. I'd say more like 3 or even 2 mph is far more logical.

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