Some historians have suggested that the Lexington Company remained on the town common so as to ensure the lives of its residents was safeguarded from the regulars. The Reverend Clarke noted in 1776 “Upon this intelligence, as also upon information of the conduct of the officers as above-mentioned, the militia of this town were alarmed, and ordered to meet on the usual place of parade; not with any design of commencing hostilities upon the king’s troops, but to consult what might be done for our own and the people’s safety.” Granted, Captain Parker and his men were concerned about British soldiers possibly looting or killing people as they passed through Lexington, but most of the civilian population had evacuated by the time the regulars arrived in Lexington.
Likewise, historian J. L. Bell correctly notes in his work The Road to Concord: How Four Stolen Cannons Ignited the Revolutionary War, the Lexington militia was initially under the mistaken belief that the primary objective of the British expedition was John Hancock and Sam Adams and not the supply depot in Concord. Both of these men, and their assistants, were still in Lexington the morning of April 19, 1775. Thus, protecting two high ranking members of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress was a possible motivation to form on the town common.
However, both men fled prior to the arrival of the regulars. More importantly, the Lexington men concluded at some point before the skirmish that the British goal of capturing Adams and Hancock was secondary at best. “It was shrewdly suspected that they were ordered to seize and destroy the stores of arms belonging to the colony, then deposited at Concord, in consequence of General Gage's unjustifiable seizure of the provincial magazine of powder at Medford, and other colony stores, in several other places.”
Thus, public safety and protection of governmental leaders were not sufficient factors by themselves to justify forming in an open field...especially in light of the circumstances facing Parker on April 19th.
The question remains: why would Parker choose the town common? In hindsight, it would have been a tactically better choice if Parker had positioned his men on a nearby ridge or road. From either of these positions, the town could have easily been protected from looting and destruction. According to the Reverend Clarke, this option was actually discussed. “The commanding officer though best to call the company together,—not with any design of opposing so superior a force, much less of commencing hostilities; but only with a view to determine what to do, when and where to meet, and to dismiss and disperse.”
Of course, what most likely influenced Parker’s decision was a series of incidents that occurred during the Spring of 1775 when militia companies would muster and then appear in plain view before British regiments marching into the Middlesex countryside for exercise. “Whenever the weather is fine, some of the Regiments off duty continue the practice of marching into the Country to the distance of from 4 to 8 Miles, with Arms, Knapsacks, &c, and return before dinner.” The British regiments never attacked and intentionally avoided the militia companies they observed.
However, both men fled prior to the arrival of the regulars. More importantly, the Lexington men concluded at some point before the skirmish that the British goal of capturing Adams and Hancock was secondary at best. “It was shrewdly suspected that they were ordered to seize and destroy the stores of arms belonging to the colony, then deposited at Concord, in consequence of General Gage's unjustifiable seizure of the provincial magazine of powder at Medford, and other colony stores, in several other places.”
Thus, public safety and protection of governmental leaders were not sufficient factors by themselves to justify forming in an open field...especially in light of the circumstances facing Parker on April 19th.
The question remains: why would Parker choose the town common? In hindsight, it would have been a tactically better choice if Parker had positioned his men on a nearby ridge or road. From either of these positions, the town could have easily been protected from looting and destruction. According to the Reverend Clarke, this option was actually discussed. “The commanding officer though best to call the company together,—not with any design of opposing so superior a force, much less of commencing hostilities; but only with a view to determine what to do, when and where to meet, and to dismiss and disperse.”
Of course, what most likely influenced Parker’s decision was a series of incidents that occurred during the Spring of 1775 when militia companies would muster and then appear in plain view before British regiments marching into the Middlesex countryside for exercise. “Whenever the weather is fine, some of the Regiments off duty continue the practice of marching into the Country to the distance of from 4 to 8 Miles, with Arms, Knapsacks, &c, and return before dinner.” The British regiments never attacked and intentionally avoided the militia companies they observed.
From the colonists perspective, the alarming and mustering of militia companies most likely served as a deterrent to British aggression. “The people of the Country are extremely jealous of these movements, and some of them constantly attend, apparently to observe if there is any particular object in view, and to convey intelligence if necessary.”
Lieutenant Frederick MacKenzie describes one such incident that occured on March 1, 1775. A British detachment was patrolling its defensive lines near Roxbury. According to the officer, “The Advanced Guards at the Lines have of Late been ordered to send out patroles towards Roxbury. A patrole going out last night, fell in with a party of the Roxbury people, with Arms, patroling towards our Lines, but as soon as the Latter perceived our people they took to their heels towards Roxbury.”
Lieutenant John Barker noted on “March 30th [1775]. The 1st. Brigade marched into the Country at 6 oclock in the morning; it alarmed the people a good deal. Expresses were sent to every town near; at Watertown about 9 miles off, they got 2 pieces of Cannon to the Bridge and loaded ’em but nobody wou’d stay to fire them; at Cambridge they were so alarmed that they pulled up the Bridge. However, they were quit for their fears, for after marching about the Country for five hours we returned peaceably home.”
Almost ten days before the Battle of Lexington, MacKenzie observed “The 38th. and 52ed. Regiments marched out this Morning as far as Watertown, and did not return to Boston ’till 5 oClock in the Afternoon. As Watertown is further out than the Regiments have usually gone, and they remained out longer, the Country was a good deal alarmed on the Occasion.” In a supplemental entry into his journal, the officer further noted “It has been usual for some of the troops, whenever the weather was favorable, to march several miles into the Country, and return in the Afternoon. The 38th & 52ed Regiments marched once to Watertown, which indeed occasioned some alarm, and Cannon were fired, bells rung, and expresses sent off, to give the alarm; but as they returned again the same Evening after refreshing their men, the people were eased of their fears, and there was no assemblage of any consequence.”
It is possible that in addition to the shadowing of British regiments as they maneuvered throughout the countryside, Parker could also have been influenced by the events of the Salem Affair. On February 26, 1775, British soldiers landed in Marblehead and advanced on Salem with orders to seize artillery pieces allegedly stored there. Upon arrival, the regulars were greeted by a large mob and local militia companies. After a tense standoff, the regulars were permitted to search for the cannons in question. When the soldiers came up empty they returned to Boston.
Thus, given the existing precedent of militia companies openly mustering in response to British countryside maneuvers, as well as the events of the Salem Affair, it is logical to see why Parker decided to form his company on the Lexington Common.
The nerds of Historical Nerdery would like to thank J.L. Bell and Tom Fitzpatrick for sharing relevant quotes with us!!
What, no mention of the Provincial Congress recommending an Army of Observation kick into gear and act only defensively if ever 500+ troops marched out of Boston?
ReplyDeleteLOL...interesting point. Those recommendations definitely kicked into play on April 19th, but they still don't address why Parker chose the Lexington Common to field instead of...say Bedford Road, Concord Hill or the ridge line near Munroe Tavern.
ReplyDelete